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Renunciation by the Heir, Devisee or Legatee
By JoHN E. HowE*
In discussing the problem of renunciation by the heir, devisee
or legatee one is not confronted with the problem of framing a
factual situation to illustrate the unjustness of the present rule.
In Hardenbergh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue' we have
an actual case which serves that purpose. In that case the de-
cedent left to survive him as his only heirs at law a wife, daughter
and son. Prior to the time of his death he had made statements
which indicated his intent to make a will by which he would give
all of his property to the son. The will was never executed, but
after his death the wife and daughter renounced the interest
that they had in the estate so that the supposed intent of the
deceased would be effected. The Collector of Internal Revenue
became involved at this point, because it was his contention that
the renunciation was actually a transfer from the decedent's
wife and daughter to the son, and that the transfer was taxable
under the federal gift tax law. The courts agreed with this con-
tention.
The decision in the case is based on the theory that an heir
can not renounce the share he receives under the Statute of De-
scent and Distribution. Therefore, when one has an attempted
renunciation and the property passes to another, the title that is
taken is deemed to come from the renouncer, and the renunciation
has the effect of an outright transfer.
The decision in the Hardenbergh case has been criticized for
two reasons. First: Regardless of prior decisions, the assessment
of a gift tax in such circumstances is unconstitutional. Second:
The authority upon which the court relied, when traced to its
original source, does not support the rule that an heir can not
renounce his inheritance.2
0 A.B., Western Kentucky State Teachers College; LL.B., University of Ken-
tucky; LL.M., University of Michigan. Member of Kentucky and Missouri Bars.
Associate Professor, St. Louis University School of Law, St. Louis 8, Mo.
1198 F. 2d 68 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 844 U.S. 886 (1952).
'Roehner and Roehner, Renunciation As Taxable Gift-An Unconstitutional
Tax Decision, 8 T-x L. R. 289 (1958).
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It may seem incredible that an heir, or devisee, or legatee
would refuse to take a valuable asset that is given to him without
any consideration on his part. In the ordinary case he will not
refuse this legacy or inheritance, but under some circumstances
he finds it necessary to renounce the gift in order to accomplish
an objective that he has in mind. In the Hardenbergh Case the
heirs renounced to bring about the decedenes expressed intention.
In some instances the heir has attempted to renounce to prevent
his creditor from reaching the property,3 or to fulfill an obliga-
tion that was taken when the heir became a member of a re-
ligious order requiring him to forego tangible wealth.4 The
devisee or legatee has also renounced to defeat his creditors;5
to prevent liability for a statutory assessment against bank stock,
which stock was the subject matter of the legacy;( to escape the
burden of a charge on devised realty;7 to defeat the wife's claim
to the property in a divorce suit;8 to defeat the will, and thus per-
mit the assets to pass as intestate property;9 to accelerate a re-
mainder;10 to remove any objection that he is not a competent
witness because of his interest;1 and to enable him to recover a
fee as attorney that is greater than the sum prescribed by the
testator.' -
The Hardenbergh case, in holding that the heir could not re-
nounce, followed a rule that is supported by a majority of the
cases involving the problem. 3 On the other hand, the courts have
' Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W. 2d 729 (1943); Bostian v. Milens,
239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. 2d 797 (1946); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig,
23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W. 2d 197 (1939).
'In Re Johnston's Estate, 186 Wis. 599, 203 N.W. 376 (1925).
'In Re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401 (1940); Bogenrief v.
Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229 (1937); Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239
N.W. 564 (1931); Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 979, 213 N.W. 608 (1927); Schoon-
over v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In Re Wilson's Estate, 298
N.Y. 898, 83 N.E. 2d 852 (1949); Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W.
502, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595 (1908).
'Hardesty v. Corrothers et al., 31 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. W.Va. 1940); Bacon
v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 123 A.L.R. 253 (1939).
'Foulkes v. Foulkes, 173 Ark. 188, 293 S.W. 1 (1927); Windquist v. Doering,
135 Kan. 92, 9 P. 2d 632 (1932); Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 378, 140 At. 100
(1928).
'Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P. 2d 768 (1934).
'In Re Murphy's Estate, 217 Iowa 1291, 252 N.W. 532 (1934); Davenport
v. Sandeman, 204 Iowa 927, 216 N.W. 55 (1927).
" Albright et al. v. Albright et al., 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W. 2d 415 (1951).
' Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N.Y. 93 (1855).
"Kingdom of Yugo-Slavia v. Jovanovich, 100 Colo. 406, 69 P. 2d 311 (1937).
" Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W. 2d 729 (1943); Bostian v.
Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. 2d 797 (1946); see Watson v. Watson, 13
RENUNCIATION
permitted the devisee or legatee to renounce the benefit that ac-
crues to him under the will of the decedent.14 Why should the
heir be denied the right to refuse his inheritance while a devisee
or legatee is allowed to reject the provision that has been made
for him? Permitting renunciation in the one case and refusing it
in the other does not seem logical, but the courts justify this in-
consistency on the theory that the title is cast on the heir by
operation of law,15 that this passage of title is regulated entirely
by statute,"0 and that one should not have the power to prevent
or defeat a result that has been brought about by statute. The
net effect of this reasoning compels one to accept as correct the
premise that the law can do no wrong, and that one who is
given property through operation of the Statute of Descent
and Distribution has no right to refuse it. We must further ac-
cept as a conclusive fact the presumption that the legislature has
acted for the best interests of the person, and that for this reason
such person should not be allowed to make any decision or elec-
tion which would defeat the result that the legislature has said
should occur. However, where property passes under a last will
and testament it is given to the beneficiary by the act of an in-
dividual and to require him to accept it may not be for his best
interests. For that reason he should be given an option to refuse
the gift. While one can not dispute the right to refuse a devise
that has been burdened with an onerous condition, it would seem
equally true that each person is entitled to decide for himself
Conn. 88, 85 (1838); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134
S.W. 2d 197, 202 (1939); In Re Johnston's Estate, 186 Wis. 599, 203 N.W. 376,
378 (1925).
" Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); Hardesty v. Cor-
rothers et al., 31 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. W.Va. 1940); Kingdom of Yugo-Slavia v.
Jovanovich, 100 Colo. 406, 69 P. 2d 311 (1937); People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203,
162 N.E. 848 (1928); Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931);
Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 979, 213 N.W. 608 (1927); Schoonover v. Osborne,
193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In Re Wells' Estate, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N.W.
713 (1909); In Re Stone's Estate, 132 Iowa 136, 109 N.W. 455, 10 Ann. Cas.
1033 (1906); Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 378, 140 At. 100 (1928); In Re Meyer's
Estate, 137 Misc. 730, 244 N.Y.S. 328 (1930); In Re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div.
439, 85 N.Y.S. 949 (1903); Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N.Y. 93 (1855); Bradord v.
Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595 (1908); Bacon v.
Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 123 A.L.R. 253 (1939); see Kearley v. Crawford,
112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293, 297 (1933); In Re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17,
163 AUt. 234, 236 (1932); Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P. 2d 768, 771 (1984);
Tarr v. Robinson, 158 Pa. 60, 27 AUt. 859, 860 (1893).
"Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W. 2d 729 (1943).
"People v. Flanagin, 331 III. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928).
"Bostian v. Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. 2d 797 (1946).
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whether or not his succession (either testate or intestate) is
burdensome, and if he determines that it is such then he should
be allowed to reject the same regardless of his position as an heir,
a devisee or a legatee.-" In other words, and without regard to
the character of the rule that is adopted, there should be no dif-
ferentiation made between testate and intestate succession.
The devisee or legatee has even been given the right to re-
nounce in a case where his refusal to accept was motivated by
the fear that the property would be taken by his creditors to
satisfy their claims. 9 In fact, the courts do not consider the
motive which prompts the beneficiary to renounce, because the
right that he has to renounce is considered to be superior to any
claim that his creditors may have2 Possibly this rule can be
justified on the theory that the right to elect is personal, and that
any election must therefore depend on the intent of the individual
himself. If we refuse to give him the right to renounce a devise
or legacy we are saying in effect that he accepts such. From
this forced acceptance it follows that he intended to accept, and
the ultimate result is that the court forms the intent that should
remain with the person himself. We must admit that the court
has refused to compel a surviving husband to take against the
will even though creditors were prejudiced thereby,"' but does
it necessarily follow that we should also refuse to do anything
that would interfere with a beneficiary's choice as to whether he
will accept or refuse that which is given to him by a last will and
testament?
The wisdom of allowing the devisee to refuse the devise to
the prejudice of his creditors was raised in one of the early cases.22
The court, in that case, suggested the possibility of presuming
an acceptance, and once an acceptance-even though presumed-
was found, it would be a fraud on the creditors to allow the
beneficiary to change his mind and reject the provision of the
will. However, with one possible exception, the right of the de-
s It is probably true that burdens are more likely to be found in testate
succession as the testator may attach a condition to the devise or bequest, but an
inheritance-even though free from conditions-can also in the eyes of the heir be
the proverbial "white elephant."
9 Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 979, 213 N.W. 608 (1927); Bradford v. Calhoun,
120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595 (1908).
' Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922).
'Pike County v. Sowards, 147 Ky. 37, 143 S.W. 745 (1912).
"Ex Parte Fuller, 2 Story 327 (U.S. 1842).
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visee or legatee to renounce has not been questioned. In a Cali-
fornia case23 the beneficiary under a will was indebted on certain
notes. The holders of the notes brought suit and recovered judg-
ments. When writs of attachment were levied on the debtor's
interest in the estate, the debtor tried to renounce. In its opinion
the court said:
A legatee is free to renounce even a beneficial bequest, so
long as the rights of third parties are not involved. If, how-
ever, the claims of his creditors would thereby be defeated
he can not exercise the same freedom.
24
The California case stands alone insofar as creditors are con-
cerned. One difficulty that is encountered in giving relief to
creditors who are prejudiced by the renunciation lies in the failure
of the court to find some firm basis to permit the devisee or
legatee to renounce, and at the same time permit the creditors
to reach the property. It has been suggested that a renunciation
to defeat creditors is in the same category as a conveyance in
fraud of the creditors. Where one does convey to defraud credi-
tors it is quite common to have a statutory provision providing
that such conveyance is void insofar as the creditors are con-
cerned.2 5 For that reason the court should either set aside the
renunciation on the theory that the situation is covered by the
statute, or it should enjoin the devisee from renouncing.26 How-
ever, in the case where this was suggested the court refused to
enjoin because the will specifically gave the beneficiaries the right
to renounce.
Even without such a right being spelled out in the will it is
doubtful that a different result would be reached. This would
follow from the effect that the courts give a renunciation. While
the cases are not in complete agreement as to the effect of the
renunciation, they all seem to agree that the title does not pass
from the devisee or legatee in the event the testamentary gift is
'In Re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401 (1940).
"Id. at 810, 108 P. 2d at 404.
For example, Ky. REv. STAT. 378.010 provides: "Every gift, conveyance,
assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate, real or personal, or right
or thing in action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with the intent to delay,
hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or other persons, and every bond or other
evidence of debt given, action commenced or judgment suffered, with like intent,
shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons ......
"Ohio National Bank of Columbus v. Miller et al., Court of Appeals of Ohio,
Franklin County, 57 N.E. 2d 717 (1943).
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refused. One line of cases adopts the theory that the title passes
to the legatee or devisee, but that a renunciation relates back to
the time when, under the law, the will became effective. 7 The
net effect is that the beneficiary never had the title, and you can
not therefore treat his refusal to accept as a transfer from him to
the person that takes because of such renunciation. A second
theory is based upon the thought that the title does not pass to
the devisee or legatee until he has by some means indicated his
acceptance of the provision that has been made for him. Thus,
a refusal to accept could not be treated as a conveyance, because
the beneficiary under the will has nothing to convey until he does
accept."' This latter view may be capable of division into two
branches; one line holding that there must actually be an ac-
ceptance, the other making use of a presumption of ac-
ceptance, which presumption is erased when the devisee or
legatee actually renounces.2 9 The net result of any view is about
the same; a renunciation by the devisee or legatee is not to be
considered as a transfer by him, because he has nothing that can
be the subject matter of a conveyance or transfer. Thus, under
neither theory would the renunciation be said to amount to a
conveyance or transfer.
Where the court can find an acceptance or a defective re-
nunciation the creditor will be protected, and he can subject the
beneficiary's interest to the payment of the debt.30 This is especi-
ally important as the courts say that they will presume that a
person will accept items of value, and that a legacy or devise
which is beneficial to the person receiving it will not be re-
nounced.3 For this reason it is essential that the beneficiary, in
order to defeat his creditor, take some step to indicate his un-
willingness to accept the provision made for him. If he has no
desire to take the testamentary gift he must-by some positive act
-indicate his renunciation or refusal of the provision.3 2 The in-
=People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928); Schoonover v.
Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In Re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y.
398, 83 N.E. 2d 852 (1949); In Re Meyer's Estate, 137 Misc. 730, 244 N.Y.S.
328 (1930).
'Bouse v. Hull, 168 Md. 1, 176 AU. 645 (1935); Greely v. Houston, 149
Miss. 799, 114 So. 740 (1927); Olsen v. Wright, 119 N.J. Eq. 103, 181 AUt. 182
(1935).
'Succession of Tertron, 217 La. 901, 47 S. 2d 681 (1950).
'oIn Re Howe's Estate, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 At. 234 (1932).
"See note 43, infra.
"Ex Parte Fuller, 2 Story 327 (U.S. 1842); Peter v. Peter, 343 111. 493, 175
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dication of his rejection need not be made by a deed, the renun-
ciation being determined in many cases by the acts of the party.3
It may seem that a refusal by a devisee should be by deed as the
subject matter is real property, but when one remembers that a
renunciation is not a transfer it follows that there would be no
sound reason to require the refusal to be by deed. However, the
rejection should not be in the form of an assignment, as this in-
dicates an acceptance coupled with a transfer or conveyance 4
Furthermore, the renunciation by the devisee or legatee is re-
quired to be made within a reasonable time. 5 Whether or not
he has done so is a question to be determined from the facts of
the case, and this will in most instances be a matter to be decided
by the jury."6 However, in any event the renunciation must be
made before there has been an acceptance. 3 The case of In Re
Howe's Estate38 involved an attempted renunciation some four
months after the will was admitted to probate. The court did not
permit the renunciation because it was felt that an unreasonable
period of time had elapsed even though a statute gave the sur-
viving widow six months to decide whether she would take the
testamentary provision made for her, or her statutory share. How-
ever, the renunciation in that case was made by the personal
representative of the devisee and the court may have been in-
fluenced by the argument that the personal representative of the
devisee should not have had a right to renounce. A period of six
years has been held to be an unreasonable time in which to re-
nounce, the court finding that the presumption of acceptance
became conclusive during that time. 9 The same result has been
N.E. 846 (1931); In Re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E. 2d 852 (1949);
Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 128 A.L.R. 253 (1939).
" Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); King v. Gridley, 46
Conn. 555 (1879); Albany Hospital v. Hanson, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E. 812
(1915); American Church Missionary Society v. Griswold College, 27 Misc. 42,
58 N.Y.S. 3 (1899); Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502, 19 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 595 (1908).
M"McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W. 2d 197
(1939).
'Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); In Re Howe's Estate,
112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (1932); In Re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83
N.E. 2d 852 (1949); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 123 A.L.R. 253
(1939).
Bacon v. Barber, supra note 35.
"Bogerief v. Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229 (1937); Blake v. Blake,
147 Ore. 43, 31 P. 2d 768 (1934); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.
App. 434, 134 S.W. 2d 197 (1939).
n112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (1932).
"Storm v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917).
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reached where the devisee waited 13 years before renouncing.40
However, in an Iowa case the devisee was allowed to renounce
four years after the will became effective, because it was found
that no one would suffer by the delay. 1 Of course the courts
will presume an acceptance in the event that the testamentary
provision is beneficial to the devisee or legatee,4 but this pre-
sumption of acceptance is not conclusive and the beneficiary may
overcome it by evidence showing that he did renounce.43 The
effect of the presumption is expressed in the case of Bacon vs.
Barber where the court stated:44
... the presumption [of acceptance] has the effect of cast-
ing upon the party claiming nonacceptance the duty of go-
ing forward with the evidence in support of his contention.
[Citations omitted]. In this meaning of the phrase, the
burden of proof is upon him. [Citations omitted].
It does not seem just to allow a renunciation where the
creditors of the devisee or legatee would be allowed to reach
the property to satisfy their claim if the beneficiary accepted. In
the case of a general power of appointment the donee of the
power is not compelled to exercise it in favor of his creditors, but
if he does exercise the power in favor of a volunteer the courts
will permit the creditors to take the subject matter of the power
even though it was exercised for the benefit of third persons.
45
In other words, the courts will compel the donee of a power to
act equitably for the benefit of his creditors, but in the case of a
renunciation a different result is reached. In fact, in a renuncia-
tion the creditors are harmed because the devisee or legatee acts
whereas, in a power the creditors would take nothing if the donee
fails to act.
The courts have had little difficulty in disposing of the prop-
" Crumpler v. Bartfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S.E. 808 (1902).
Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 289 N.W. 564 (1931).
"There may be a presumption that an onerous devise or bequest is refused.
See Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 378, 140 At. 100 (1928); Bradford v. Leake, 124
Tenn. 312, 137 S.W. 96 (1911).
11Ex Parte Fuller, 2 Story 327 (U.S. 1842); Hardesty v. Corrothers et al, 31
F. Supp. 365 (N.D. W.Va. 1940); Storm v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100
(1917); Bouse v. Hull, 168 Md. 1, 176 AtI. 645 (1935); Olsen v. Wright, 119
N.J. Eq. 103, 181 AtI. 182 (1935); In Re Howe's Estate, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163
Atl. 234 (1932); In Re Waring's Will, 298 N.Y. 186, 56 N.E. 2d 543 (1944);
Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 312, 137 S.W. 96 (1911).
44 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9, 12 (1939).
111 StEs, Frrxrus INTmESTS sec. 265 (1936).
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erty that the devisee or legatee refuses to accept. Where the
devise or bequest is rejected, and there is a residuary clause that
is broad enough to include the rejected property, the same will
go into the residue of the estate and pass to the residuary
legatee.4 If the residuary clause is not broad enough to cover
the rejected property, i.e., where a devisee rejects and the residu-
ary clause includes only the personal property, the property passes
as intestate property.47 The property that is not accepted will also
pass to the heirs when the residuary legatee renounces, provided
that there is no alternate or joint residuary legatee who will be
entitled to take.48
Some difficulty could be experienced in disposing of property
that the beneficiary under the will has rejected. Assume for ex-
ample that the sole residuary legatee renounces and that such
legatee is also one of the heirs. From what has been said, such
residuary legatee would not be allowed to renounce his intestate
share as an heir. Thus, if he had creditors who wanted to take
the property, he would defeat them from taking the share that
he would receive as a residuary legatee, but he would immedi-
ately place at their disposal the share that he would take as an
heir. Should we, in that case, make an exception and allow the
heir to renounce so that the creditors would be completely de-
feated in their attempt to reach the property? Another case that
presents a special problem involves the devisee who renounces to
escape a burdensome condition that has been attached to the
gift by the testator. This beneficiary, if he is also an heir, may
renounce the devise and then claim that he is entitled to a share
of the property as heir of the decedent. In that case it would
seem doubtful that the court could attach any condition on the
property that passes under the intestate succession, but at the
same time it does not seem right to permit the devisee-heir to
take even a part of the property free and clear of the condition
that was attached by the testator. It is true that the condition
might be deemed to be a charge on the land, and that the bene-
"In Re Arms' Estate, 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1058 (1921); Myers v. Smith,
235 Iowa 885, 16 N.V. 2d 628 (1944); In Re Meyer's Estate, 187 Misc. 780, 244
N.Y.S. 328 (1930); In Re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div. 489, 85 N.Y.S. 949 (1903).
"'Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Maine 269 (1848); Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 878,
140 Ad. 100 (1928).
" Brown v. Kalene et al, 230 Iowa 76, 296 N.W. 809 (1941); Lehr v.
Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931).
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ficiary of the charge could enforce his lien against the property
even though the devisee has renounced, 4 but this result could
not be achieved where the condition does not amount to a charge.
Another problem arises where the beneficiary wishes to re-
nounce one gift but accept others. In the normal case, unless the
contrary appears, the devisee or legatee cannot reject the burden-
some part of the gift and accept that which is beneficial.",
The phrase "unless the contrary appears" is of little assistance
in making a determination as to whether or not there can be a
partial renunciation. If the will specifically provides that the
beneficiary shall have a right to take part and refuse part there
will be little question about his right to do so. But, very few wills
are that explicit. If it appears that there are two separate and
distinct provisions for the beneficiary he will have the right to
renounce one and accept the other."' However, no infallible test
seems to exist for determining whether there are two separate
gifts, or one gift with two parts. The right of partial renunciation
may also be permitted where the beneficiary takes in two capaci-
ties, i.e., one part absolutely and the other part as a trustee. In
that case he will be permitted to reject the absolute interest, but
accept the part that is given to him as a trustee. 2 These are two
examples where the contrary has appeared and as the cases in-
crease in number the list should also expand.
Conclusions
(1) The desirability of the present rule is doubted. If the
devisee or legatee is allowed to renounce, the heir should be
given a like right. The reason advanced by the court for the
discrepancy does not justify it, and no sound basis presents itself
for compelling the heir to accept that which is cast upon him.
(2) Assuming that there should be some rule that applies
equally to the heir, devisee or legatee, one is confronted with the
problem as to just what the rule should be. Possibly the better
' Olsen v. Wright, 119 N.J. Eq. 103, 181 Ad. 182 (1935).
'Foulkes v. Foulkes, 173 Ark. 188, 293 S.W. 1 (1927); Brown v. Kalene et
al, 230 Iowa 76, 296 N.W. 809 (1941); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A. 2d 9
(1939); see Austin v. Collins, 317 Mo. 435, 438, 297 S.W. 36, 37 (1927).
'Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); State Banking Co. v.
Hinton, 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42 (1933).
' In Re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div. 439, 85 N.Y.S. 949 (1903).
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rule is to allow the party to reject the testamentary or statutory
provision that is made for him. In the case of a gift he has this
right,5 3 and as a practical matter the devise or inheritance is very
similar to a gift. 4
(3) If we give the party a right to renounce, should the right
be absolute? No, the right to renounce must be qualified. If the
property could be taken by a third person to satisfy his claim
against the beneficiary in the event that the beneficiary were to
accept, then the third person should be given the right to prevent
a renunciation of that part of the property which he desires to
subject to the satisfaction of his claim. However, this qualifica-
tion should be limited to claims that exist prior to a renunciation
on the part of the beneficiary.
(4) The three suggestions above may eventually be adopted
by judicial decision, but the result can be achieved much faster
by appropriate legislation. For that reason the states would do
well to consider the enactment of laws that would accomplish
those objectives.
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY sec. 50 (1936).
' In Snms, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION (1942), there
is included a chapter on the problem of gifts. This would indicate that the
problems relating to gifts are at least companions to the problems in the field of
succession. Further, both gifts and succession are methods of acquiring property
without consideration.
